Monday, April 7, 2014

Brady violation---Did the government suppress evidence favorable to the defendant and material.

In People v Chenault, __ Mich __ (#146523, 146524, 4/4/2014) the Michigan Supreme Court held that in  order to establish a Brady violation, a defendant need only demonstrate that the government suppressed evidence that is both favorable to the defendant and material.

In Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) the United States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 US at 87. In identifying the essential components of a Brady violation, the Supreme Court has articulated a three-factor test: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must  have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. [Strickler v Greene, 527 US 263, 281-282 (1999).]  Stated differently, the components of a “true Brady violation,” are that: (1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material. Id.


The contours of these three factors are fairly settled. The government is held responsible for evidence within its control, even evidence unknown to the prosecution, Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 437 (1995), without regard to the prosecution’s good or bad faith, United States v Agurs, 427 US 97, 110 (1976) (“If the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.”). Evidence is favorable to the defense when it is either exculpatory or impeaching. Giglio v United States, 405 US 150, 154 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule [of Brady].”), quoting Napue v Illinois, 360 US 264, 269 (1959). To establish materiality, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 682 (1985). This standard “does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . . . .” Kyles, 514 US at 434. The question is whether, in the absence of the suppressed evidence, the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. In assessing the materiality of the evidence, courts are to consider the suppressed evidence collectively, rather than piecemeal. Id. at 436.

Friday, April 4, 2014

Extortion is not dependent on the seriousness or significance of the compelled act.

In People v Harris, __ Mich __ (# 146212, 10/9/2014) the defendant was convicted of extortion after he had agreed to pay another person $400 to fix the transmission on defendant’s truck. This person began working on the truck, but stopped when it began to rain. Upset by his refusal to work in the rain, defendant went into his house and returned with a gun, and said that he would “silence him” unless he resumed working on the truck or returned a portion of defendant’s down payment for the work. The person refused, defendant returned home; the officers arrived and found defendant in the driveway carrying a rifle.
 
Under the plain language of the extortion statute, MCL 750.213, extortion occurs when a defendant maliciously threatens to injure another person with the intent to compel that person to do any act against his or her will, without regard to the seriousness or significance of the compelled act, overruling People v Fobb, 145 Mich App 786 (1985), and People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459 (1996), to the extent that those decisions required that the act or omission compelled by the defendant be of serious consequence to the victim.  Under the plain language of the extortion statute, the crime of extortion is complete when a defendant (1) either orally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens (2) to accuse another of any crime or offense, or to injure the person or property or mother, father, spouse or child of another (3) with the intent to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with the intent to compel the person threatened to do or refrain from doing any act against his or her will. The Court of Appeals decisions in Fobb and Hubbard, which held that the act demanded of the victim must have been of serious consequence to the victim in order to convict a defendant of extortion, are contrary to the plain language of the statute.