Tuesday, October 27, 2015

The 'reasonableness' of a departure under Lockridge

In People v Steanhouse, __ Mich  App __ (#318329, 10/22/2015) the Court of Appeals set forth the appropriate procedure for considering the reasonableness of a departure sentence.  Under Steanhouse, supra a sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630 (1990),  and its progeny, constitutes a reasonable sentence under People v Lockridge, ___ Mich ___ (2015).
 
When Milbourn, supra, was decided, the Legislature had not enacted the statutory sentencing guidelines; the guidelines in effect were those developed by the Michigan Supreme Court and promulgated by administrative order. People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 438 (2001). Trial court judges were not required to impose a sentence within the range recommended by the sentencing guidelines; they were only required to score the guidelines and articulate the reasons for a departure from the recommended range. Id. In this context—which is strikingly similar to the role of the sentencing guidelines after Lockridge, supra, the Michigan Supreme Court overruled the “shocks the conscience” test that was previous employed under People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 550 (1983), and adopted the “principle of proportionality” test in order to determine whether a trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence. Milbourn, 435 Mich at 634-636. Under the new test, “a given sentence [could] be said to constitute an abuse of discretion if that sentence violate[d] the principle of proportionality, which require[d] sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Id. at 636. As such, trial courts were required to impose a sentence that took “into account the nature of the offense and the background of the offender.” Id. at 651.
 
In Lockridge, supra, the Court held that “the rule from Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), as extended by Alleyne v United States, 570 US ___; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013), applies to Michigan’s sentencing guidelines and renders them constitutionally deficient.  To the extent that the OVs scored on the basis of facts not admitted by the defendant or necessarily found by the jury verdict increase the floor of the guidelines range, i.e. the defendant’s ‘mandatory minimum’ sentence, that procedure violates the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, [t]o remedy the constitutional violation, [the Court] sever[ed] MCL 769.34(2) to the extent that it makes the sentencing guidelines range as scored on the basis of facts beyond those admitted by the defendant or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt mandatory. [The Court] also str[uck] down the requirement in MCL 769.34(3) that a sentencing court that departs from the applicable guidelines range must articulate a substantial and compelling reason for that departure.  The Lockridge Court also stated that a guidelines minimum sentence range calculated in violation of Apprendi and Alleyne is advisory only and that sentences that depart from that threshold are to be reviewed by appellate courts for reasonableness. To preserve as much as possible the legislative intent in enacting the guidelines, however, a sentencing court must determine the applicable guidelines range and take it into account when imposing a sentence.
 
Under Milbourn, supra, and now Lockridge, supra and Steanhouse, supra, factors to be considered by Michigan courts under the proportionality standard included, among others, (1) the seriousness of the offense, People v Houston, 448 Mich 312 (1995); (2) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the relationship between the victim and the aggressor, id. at 323; Milbourn, 435 Mich at 660, the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, Houston, 448 Mich at 323, the defendant’s expressions of remorse, id., and the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation, id.; and (3) factors that were inadequately considered by the guidelines in a particular case, id. at 324.

Thursday, October 1, 2015

Trial court’s compulsory use of the sentencing guidelines is erroneous.

In People v Terrell, __ Mich App __ (#321573, 9/29/2015) the Court of Appeals held under the recently decided Michigan Supreme Court opinion, People v Lockridge, __ Mich __ (2015), judicial fact-finding did not increase the minimum sentence guidelines, but a remand for the United Stated v Crosby, 397 F3d 103, 117-118 (CA 2, 2005) procedure was necessary to determine whether the error resulting from the trial court’s compulsory use of the guidelines was harmless.
 
The Court of Appeals adopted the remedy crafted in People v Stokes, __ Mich App __ (2015) as the appropriate remedy, because regardless of the fact that judicial fact-finding did not increase defendant’s minimum sentence guidelines range, the trial court’s compulsory use of the guidelines was erroneous in light of Lockridge, supra. In Stokes, supra, the Court of Appeals concluded that where judicially-found facts increased the minimum sentence guidelines range, the proper remedy was to remand for the Crosby procedure to be followed to determine whether the error was harmless. In Crosby, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that in cases in which a defendant’s minimum sentence was established by application of the sentencing guidelines in a manner that violated the Sixth Amendment, the case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether that court would have imposed a materially different sentence but for the constitutional error. See also United States v Fagans, 406 F3d 138, 141-142 (CA 2, 2005) (remanding for resentencing, even though judicial fact-finding did not increase the guidelines range, because the compulsory use of the guidelines was erroneous).
 
In Terrell, supra, judicial fact-finding did not increase the minimum sentence guidelines because the scoring was supported by the jury verdict. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals adopted the remedy crafted in Stokes, supra as the appropriate remedy here, because regardless of the fact that judicial fact-finding did not increase defendant’s minimum sentence guidelines range, the trial court’s compulsory use of the guidelines was erroneous in light of Lockridge, supra.