No issue of material fact if the non-moving party's evidence is blatantly contradicted by the record.

In Fuhr v Trinity Health Corporation, __ Mich __ (#147158, 10/2/2013) the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, and reinstated the March 30, 2012 order of the Kent Circuit Court granting summary disposition to the defendants. 

The Court of Appeals dissent had opined that the  plaintiff’s self-serving deposition testimony was blatantly contradicted by the record such that no reasonable jury could believe it.  In Scott v Harris, 550 US 372, 380; 127 S Ct 1769; 167 L Ed 2d 686 (2007), the United States Supreme Court, considering summary disposition under FR Civ P 56(c), which is parallel to MCR 2.116(C)(10), held that “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary disposition.” Under those circumstances, a “genuine” issue of material fact does not exist.

Emotional distress damages for breach of contract---no unless . . .

In Benefield v Village at Stonegate Pointe Condominium Association, __ Mich __ (#147214, 10/12/2013) the Michigan Supreme Court reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals judgment that reversed the trial court’s exclusion of emotional distress damages for the plaintiff’s breach of contract and negligence claims. 

Emotional distress damages are generally not recoverable for breach of a commercial contract unless such damages were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. Kewin v Massachusetts Mutual Ins Co, 409 Mich 401, 419 (1980). Emotional distress damages are also generally not recoverable for the negligent destruction of property. Price v High Pointe Oil Co, Inc, 493 Mich 238, 264 (2013).