In People v Garrison, __ Mich __ (#146626, 5/29/2014)
the Michigan Supreme Court held that the victims’ immediate need to recover
their property, inventory their losses, and explain their losses in court was a
natural consequence of defendant’s criminal activity. Hence, their travel
expenses were a direct result of defendant’s criminal course of conduct. The
sentencing court’s decision to include these expenses in its restitution order
was in keeping with its statutory duty to order defendant to pay “full
restitution.”
There are two main statutes that govern restitution in
Michigan: MCL 780.766 (part of the CVRA) and MCL 769.1a (the general
restitution statute). Both statutes begin by defining “victim” as “an
individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, financial, or emotional
harm as a result of the commission of a crime.” The statutes then declare
that sentencing courts “shall order” a defendant convicted of a crime to “make
full restitution to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives
rise to the conviction or to the victim’s estate.” Several following
subsections in the statutes go on to provide detailed instructions regarding
how to calculate restitution for various types of injuries. Subsection (3) of each statute14 pertains
to property loss; Subsection (4) of each statute pertains to a victim’s
physical or psychological injury, and Subsection (5) of each statute also
pertains to bodily injury, including death.
The CVRA and Article 1, § 24 of Michigan’s Constitution were
enacted as part of a movement intended to balance the rights of crime victims
and the rights of criminal defendants. One aim of these laws was “to
enable victims to be compensated fairly for their suffering at the hands of
convicted offenders.” The Legislature’s statutory direction to order defendants
to pay complete, entire, and maximum restitution effectuates this goal of fair
compensation. Not all crime victims suffer property damage, personal
injury, or death. But many of these otherwise unharmed victims must travel to
reclaim property, identify perpetrators, or otherwise participate in the
investigatory process in the aftermath of a crime. These travels impose a real
financial burden on victims in the form of transportation expenses. If we
treated Subsections (3) to (5) as excluding those losses, we would not give
effect to the connection that the Legislature made between the financial harm
that a person suffers and that person’s status as a victim within the
provisions of the CVRA.
Although courts must order defendants to pay “full
restitution,” their authority to order restitution is not limitless. The
statute authorizes restitution only for damage or loss that results from a
“defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction . . . .”
This is in keeping with the statute’s definition of “victim” as “an individual
who suffers direct or threatened physical, financial, or emotional harm as a
result of the commission of a crime.” Thus, the losses included in a
restitution order must be the result of defendant’s criminal course of conduct.
