In People v Steanhouse, __
Mich App __ (#318329, 10/22/2015) the Court of Appeals set forth the appropriate procedure for considering the
reasonableness of a departure sentence. Under Steanhouse, supra a
sentence that fulfills the principle of proportionality under People
v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630 (1990), and its progeny, constitutes a reasonable sentence
under People v Lockridge, ___ Mich ___ (2015).
When Milbourn, supra, was
decided, the Legislature had not enacted the statutory sentencing guidelines;
the guidelines in effect were those developed by the Michigan Supreme Court and
promulgated by administrative order. People v Hegwood, 465 Mich 432, 438
(2001). Trial court judges were not required to impose a sentence within the
range recommended by the sentencing guidelines; they were only required to
score the guidelines and articulate the reasons for a departure from the
recommended range. Id. In this context—which is strikingly similar to
the role of the sentencing guidelines after Lockridge, supra, the
Michigan Supreme Court overruled the “shocks the conscience” test that was
previous employed under People v Coles, 417 Mich 523, 550 (1983), and
adopted the “principle of proportionality” test in order to determine whether a
trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence. Milbourn, 435
Mich at 634-636. Under the new test, “a given sentence [could] be said to
constitute an abuse of discretion if that sentence violate[d] the principle of
proportionality, which require[d] sentences imposed by the trial court to be
proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense
and the offender.” Id. at 636. As such, trial courts were required to
impose a sentence that took “into account the nature of the offense and the
background of the offender.” Id. at 651.
In Lockridge, supra, the
Court held that “the rule from Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S
Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), as extended by Alleyne v United States, 570
US ___; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013), applies to Michigan’s sentencing
guidelines and renders them constitutionally deficient. To the extent
that the OVs scored on the basis of facts not admitted by the defendant or
necessarily found by the jury verdict increase the floor of the guidelines
range, i.e. the defendant’s ‘mandatory minimum’ sentence, that procedure
violates the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, [t]o remedy the constitutional
violation, [the Court] sever[ed] MCL 769.34(2) to the extent that it makes the
sentencing guidelines range as scored on the basis of facts beyond those admitted
by the defendant or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt mandatory. [The
Court] also str[uck] down the requirement in MCL 769.34(3) that a sentencing
court that departs from the applicable guidelines range must articulate a
substantial and compelling reason for that departure.
The Lockridge Court also stated that a guidelines minimum
sentence range calculated in violation of Apprendi and Alleyne is
advisory only and that sentences that depart from that threshold are to be
reviewed by appellate courts for reasonableness. To preserve as much as
possible the legislative intent in enacting the guidelines, however, a
sentencing court must determine the applicable guidelines range and take it
into account when imposing a sentence.
Under Milbourn, supra, and now Lockridge,
supra and Steanhouse, supra, factors to be considered by Michigan
courts under the proportionality standard included, among others, (1) the
seriousness of the offense, People v Houston, 448 Mich 312 (1995); (2)
factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the relationship between the
victim and the aggressor, id. at 323; Milbourn, 435 Mich at 660,
the defendant’s misconduct while in custody, Houston, 448 Mich at 323,
the defendant’s expressions of remorse, id., and the defendant’s potential
for rehabilitation, id.; and (3) factors that were inadequately
considered by the guidelines in a particular case, id. at 324.
