In People v Lown, __ Mich __ (#139969, 1/14/2011) the Michigan Supreme court re-affirmed that the statutory “180-day rule”, established by MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133, to dispose of new criminal charges against inmates in Michigan correctional facilities requires dismissal of the case if the prosecutor fails to commence action on charges pending against an inmate within 180 days after the Department of Corrections delivers notice of the inmate’s imprisonment. The rule does not require that a trial be commenced or completed within 180 days of the date notice was delivered; it is sufficient that the prosecutor “proceed promptly” and “move the case to the point of readiness for trial” within the 180-day period. People v Hendershot, 357
300, 304 (1959). There is, however, no good-faith exception to the rule. Instead, good faith is an implicit component of proper action by the prosecutor, who may not satisfy the rule simply by taking preliminary steps toward trial but then delaying inexcusably. Mich
The statutory 180-day period is, by the plain terms of the statute, a fixed period of consecutive days beginning on the date when the prosecutor receives the required notice from the DOC. Thus, the relevant question is not whether any delay is attributable to the prosecutor, but whether action was commenced within 180 calendar days following the date the prosecutor received the notice. If so, the rule has been satisfied unless the prosecutor’s initial steps are “followed by inexcusable delay beyond the 180-day period and an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly. Accordingly, a court should not calculate the 180-day period by apportioning to each party any periods of delay after the DOC delivers notice.
A violation of the 180-day rule deprives the court of “jurisdiction under MCL 780.133 and specifically divests the court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant for the particular action, and the court must dismiss the matter with prejudice.