Established custodial environment--explained

In Goble v Goble, Unpub per curiam opinion, (#307614, 7/19/2012) the Court of Appeals reiterated that “[W]hen considering an important decision affecting the welfare of the child, the trial court must first determine whether the proposed change would modify the established custodial environment of that child. In making this determination, it is the child’s standpoint, rather than that of the parents, that is controlling.” Pierron v Pierron, 486 Mich 81, 92 (2010). “[W]hether a custodial environment has been established is an intense factual inquiry.” Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 6 (2001). An established custodial environment exists if “over an appreciable time the child naturally looks to the custodian in that environment for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” MCL 722.27(1)(c). “It is both a physical and a psychological environment that fosters a relationship between custodian and child and is marked by security, stability, and permanence.” Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 706 (2008). “An established custodial environment may exist with both parents where a child looks to both the mother and the father for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.” Id. at 707. 

“If an established custodial environment exists with one parent and not the other, then the noncustodial parent bears the burden of persuasion and must show by clear and convincing evidence that a change in the custodial environment is in the child’s best interests.” In re AP, 283 Mich App 574, 601 (2009). However, where “the record supports an established custodial environment with both parents . . . neither plaintiff’s nor defendant’s established custodial environment may be disrupted except on a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that such a disruption is in the children’s best interests.” Foskett, 247 Mich App at 8 (emphasis in original).

Whether an established custodial environment exists is a question of fact. Mogle v Scriver, 241 Mich App 192, 197 (2000). The great weight of the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact, and a trial court’s findings regarding the existence of an established custodial environment should be affirmed unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 20 (2000).

In Goble, the trial court did not make findings of fact to support its conclusion that an established custodial environment existed solely with plaintiff other than to point out that, while commendable, during the marriage defendant worked outside the home while plaintiff stayed at home to care for the child. However, the trial court also found that both parties loved the minor child equally and that defendant displayed an equal capacity and disposition to give her love, affection, and guidance. The trial court described both parties as “hands-on parents” and specifically noted that after the parties’ separation defendant and the child spent one-on-one time together doing household chores, going to the park, and reading together. The trial court also found that defendant was the primary provider of the minor child’s material necessities. Thus, we find on this record that the great weight of the evidence establishes that the minor child (who was too young to weigh in on the matter) looked to both plaintiff and defendant “for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort[,]” MCL 722.27(1)(c), and that her relationship with both parents was “marked by qualities of security, stability, and permanence.” Mogle, 241 Mich App at 197. As such, the trial court’s contrary finding was against the great weight of the evidence.

Because the minor child had an established custodial environment with both parties, neither party could disrupt the other’s established custodial environment without showing by clear and convincing evidence that such a disruption was in the minor child’s best interests. See Foskett, 247 Mich App at 8. The record before us indicates that plaintiff has been the minor child’s primary caregiver since birth and that the minor child has spent the majority of her time, both before and after the parties’ separation, with plaintiff. The minor child has lived in the marital residence her entire life, which is approximately one hour away from defendant’s residence. Thus, we find that the trial court’s finding that granting defendant sole physical custody of the minor child would disrupt her established custodial environment with plaintiff was not against the great weight of the evidence. See Pierron, 486 Mich at 86-87, 89. In reaching this conclusion, the trial court properly required defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that granting him sole physical custody was in the minor child’s best interests. See Foskett, 247 Mich App at 8. However, because an established custodial environment existed with defendant as well, in seeking sole physical custody of the minor child, plaintiff likewise bore the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that granting her sole physical custody was in the minor child’s best interests. See id.; see also In re AP, 283 Mich App at 601-602. The trial court committed clear legal error by failing to require plaintiff to meet this burden.