Court Jurisdiction

In Moody v Get Well Medical Treatment, __ Mich App __ (#301783, 2/25/2014) the Court of Appeals held that Courts are bound to take notice of the limits of their authority, and a court may, and should, on its own motion, though the question is not raised by the pleadings or by counsel, recognize its lack of jurisdiction and act accordingly by staying proceedings, dismissing the action, or otherwise disposing thereof, at any stage of the proceeding. When a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, any action with respect to such a cause, other than to dismiss it, is void, and consequently its proceedings may be questioned collaterally as well as directly.

In Michigan the circuit court is the primary court having jurisdiction over civil cases.  MCL 600.605 provides: “Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.” MCL 600.8301(1) provides for an exception for bringing civil actions in district court “when the amount in controversy does not exceed $25,000.00.  

A court is continually obliged to question sua sponte its own jurisdiction over a person, the subject matter of an action, or the limits of the relief it may afford,  In this case, the district court should have either dismissed plaintiff’s case or transferred it to circuit court pursuant to MCR 2.227(A)(1), which provides:  When the court in which a civil action is pending determines that it lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, but that some other Michigan court would have jurisdiction of the action, the court may order the action transferred to the other court in a place where venue would be proper. If the question of jurisdiction is raised by the court on its own initiative, the action may not be transferred until the parties are given notice and an opportunity to be heard on the jurisdictional issue. 

Statements by a defendant in the course of plea discussions with an attorney (agent) for the prosecuting authority.

In People v Smart, ___ Mich App ___ (#314980. 2/11/2014) the Court of Appeals  affirmed the suppression of certain statements made by the defendant to police as being in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority. The Court agreed that the statements by defendant at March 15, 2011, meeting were given “in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority” despite the absence of the physical presence of an assistant prosecuting attorney during that meeting.   

MRE 410(4) provides that “Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: * * *  (4) Any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.”   

MRE 410(4) does not explicitly state that an attorney for the prosecuting authority must be physically present when the statement is made. Rather, under MRE 410(4) statements must be made only “in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority.” “In the course of” means “in the progress or process of; during.” See, People v Williams, 288 Mich App 67, 97 (2010), citing Webster's New World Dictionary (2d college ed., 1970). 

It is conceivable that a defendant may speak to persons other than an attorney for the prosecuting authority in the course of plea discussions. Indeed, a defendant may speak to persons, such as police officers, at the direction of an attorney for the prosecuting authority in the course of plea discussions. Because MRE 410 requires that the statement sought to be excluded be made in the course of plea negotiations with an attorney for the prosecuting authority, it would stand to reason that the defendant must still have an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion and that such expectation be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. People v Dunn, 446 Mich 409, 415 (1994).  Not every requested or held discussion concerning plea negotiations will necessarily result in a plea deal. And, simply because a defendant seeks to engage in a plea negotiation does not mean that the person to whom he is speaking (a prosecuting attorney or another person) would or must view any discussion with a defendant as a plea negotiation.

Error even if not outcome determinative

In People v Harris, ___ Mich ___ (#145833, 12/20/2013) the Michigan Supreme Court held that “[t]he trial court impermissibly allowed Dr. Carrie Ricci to testify that the complainant was the victim of child sexual abuse and trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this evidence.”

On remand to the Court of Appeals, the Court is to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the admission of the doctor’s diagnosis under both the plain error test articulated in People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764 (1999), and the ineffective assistance of counsel standard. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303 (2000), quoting People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 167 (1997). See, also, Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”).