In Fujimaki v Ichikawa, Unpub Per Curiam Opin
(#324173, 11/17/2015) the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order of
summary disposition on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
stemming from parental alienation.
Plaintiff’s complaint stated that the parties were
previously married and had one child together, but they divorced in May 2004.
In September 2008, defendant acquired sole legal and physical custody of the
child. Plaintiff alleged that after defendant acquired sole custody, she
commenced a campaign to destroy his relationship with the minor child.
Plaintiff alleged that defendant consistently denied him parenting time, and,
for that reason, was found in contempt of court on two occasions and sentenced
to jail. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court ordered the child to stay with
plaintiff during defendant’s incarceration, but defendant, the child, and the
child’s school manipulated the situation, and the child stayed with a teacher
instead. Plaintiff’s complaint further alleged that the trial court ordered the
parties to undergo a psychological evaluation who found extreme parental
alienation by defendant. According to plaintiff, the trial court also found
extreme parental alienation by defendant, but concluded that it had limited
options regarding custody arrangements because the child was 17 years old and
his relationship with plaintiff was already damaged. Plaintiff alleged that he
had no relationship with his son as a result of defendant’s willful and
deliberate acts of denying him access to the child.
In order to establish a claim of intentional infliction of
emotional distress, a plaintiff must show “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct,
(2) intent or recklessness, (3) causation, and (4) severe emotional distress.” Graham
v Ford, 237 Mich App 670, 674 (1999). Liability attaches when a plaintiff
demonstrates that a defendant’s conduct was “so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Id.
The test to determine whether a defendant’s conduct was sufficiently extreme
and outrageous is whether the facts of the case would lead an average member of
the community to arouse resentment against the actor and exclaim, “Outrageous!”
Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175, 196 (2003) (citations omitted).
A
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress must be brought within
three years after the claim accrues to avoid being time-barred. Nelson v Ho,
222 Mich App 74, 85 (1997). MCL 600.5827 provides that “the claim accrues at
the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the
time when damage results.” The term “wrong” as used in MCL 600.5827 refers to
the date the plaintiff was harmed by the defendant’s act, not the date the
defendant acted. Frank v Linkner, ___ Mich App___, ___ (2015), citing Moll
v Abbott Laboratories, 444 Mich 1, 12 (1993). Otherwise, a claim could be
barred before a plaintiff suffered any injury. Frank, supra.
“Accordingly, a cause of action for a tortious injury accrues when all the
elements of the claim have occurred and can be alleged in a proper complaint.” Schaendorf
v Consumers Energy Co, 275 Mich App 507, 512 (2007) (citation omitted).
In this case, the harm on which plaintiff’s claim was based
was parental alienation, or defendant’s destruction of the relationship between
plaintiff and the child, which resulted in psychological damage to plaintiff.
The trial court found that plaintiff’s claim accrued in September 2008, when
defendant acquired sole physical and legal custody of the child and had the
ability to effectively alienate the child from plaintiff. There is no evidence
indicating that plaintiff’s relationship with the child was destroyed due to
parental alienation at that point in time, or that defendant had yet exhibited
intentional conduct that was sufficiently extreme or outrageous in nature to
give rise to a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Accepting
plaintiff’s affidavit as true, facts sufficient to sustain the elements for a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress did not arise until at
least December 31, 2011, when defendant began denying plaintiff parenting time,
which, it could be argued, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. See Schaendorf,
275 Mich App at 512 (holding that a tortious injury claim does not accrue until
all the elements of the claim have occurred). Moreover, it does not appear that
the harm of extreme parental alienation occurred until 2013. In either case,
plaintiff’s May 29, 2014 complaint fell well within the three-year limitations
period for tort claims. Accordingly, the trial court erred by finding that
plaintiff’s claim accrued in September 2008, and that summary disposition was
therefore warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
No comments:
Post a Comment