In People v Chenault, __ Mich __ (#146523, 146524,
4/4/2014) the Michigan Supreme Court held that in order to establish a
Brady violation, a defendant need only demonstrate that the government
suppressed evidence that is both favorable to the defendant and material.
In Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963) the United
States Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 US at 87. In identifying the
essential components of a Brady violation, the Supreme Court has articulated a
three-factor test: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused,
either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence
must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued. [Strickler v Greene, 527
US 263, 281-282 (1999).] Stated differently, the components of a “true
Brady violation,” are that: (1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that
is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material. Id.
The contours of these three factors are fairly settled. The
government is held responsible for evidence within its control, even evidence
unknown to the prosecution, Kyles v Whitley, 514 US 419, 437 (1995),
without regard to the prosecution’s good or bad faith, United States v Agurs,
427 US 97, 110 (1976) (“If the suppression of evidence results in
constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the
character of the prosecutor.”). Evidence is favorable to the defense when it is
either exculpatory or impeaching. Giglio v United States, 405 US 150,
154 (1972) (“When the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls
within this general rule [of Brady].”), quoting Napue v Illinois, 360 US
264, 269 (1959). To establish materiality, a defendant must show that “there is
a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 682 (1985). This standard
“does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the
suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal
. . . .” Kyles, 514 US at 434. The question is whether, in the absence
of the suppressed evidence, the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as
a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Id. In assessing the
materiality of the evidence, courts are to consider the suppressed evidence
collectively, rather than piecemeal. Id. at 436.
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