In People v Harris, __ Mich __ (#
146212, 10/9/2014) the defendant was convicted of extortion after he had agreed
to pay another person $400 to fix the transmission on defendant’s truck. This
person began working on the truck, but stopped when it began to rain. Upset by
his refusal to work in the rain, defendant went into his house and returned
with a gun, and said that he would “silence him” unless he resumed working on
the truck or returned a portion of defendant’s down payment for the work. The
person refused, defendant returned home; the officers arrived and found
defendant in the driveway carrying a rifle.
Under the plain language of the
extortion statute, MCL 750.213, extortion occurs when a defendant maliciously
threatens to injure another person with the intent to compel that person to do
any act against his or her will, without regard to the seriousness or
significance of the compelled act, overruling People v Fobb, 145 Mich
App 786 (1985), and People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459
(1996), to the extent that those decisions required that the act or omission
compelled by the defendant be of serious consequence to the victim. Under
the plain language of the extortion statute, the crime of extortion is complete
when a defendant (1) either orally or by a written or printed communication,
maliciously threatens (2) to accuse another of any crime or offense, or to
injure the person or property or mother, father, spouse or child of another (3)
with the intent to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with
the intent to compel the person threatened to do or refrain from doing any act
against his or her will. The Court of Appeals decisions in Fobb and Hubbard,
which held that the act demanded of the victim must have been of serious
consequence to the victim in order to convict a defendant of extortion, are
contrary to the plain language of the statute.
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